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1. History of EU-Turkey Relations1 
1.1. Traditional position: overwhelmingly positive 
HuŶgarǇ has supported TurkeǇ’s aĐĐessioŶ to the European Union (EU) since the country itself 
became a member in 2004. According to the official Hungarian position, the negotiations should 
be fair and, if Ankara manages to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria and implement the acquis 
communautaire, Turkey should become a full member. This stance was maintained by left- and 
right-wing governments alike, all of them saying that the dialogue needed to be continued 
regardless of any troubles between the EU and Turkey. Hungarian governments usually 
emphasized that despite their pro-accession views the issue of membership should be settled in 
the framework of the EU with the consensus of all member states. 
The most controversial issue has certainly been whether Turkey is an integral part of Europe and 
its culture. According to a Eurobarometer poll in 2005, 51 percent of the Hungarian population 
ǁas iŶ faǀour of TurkeǇ’s aĐĐessioŶ ;ǁhile the EU aǀerage ǁas ϯ9 perĐeŶtͿ aŶd soŵe 7ϱ perĐeŶt 
of respondents said that Turkey was part of Europe. It is interesting to note that the share of 
those supportiŶg TurkeǇ’s EU aĐĐessioŶ ǁas the saŵe oŶ the right aŶd left side of the politiĐal 
spectrum (50 percent each).  
1.2. Major narratives: rather interest-based  
Various narratives of the EU-Turkey negotiations have a very long tradition in Hungary that has 
developed over the decades. The generally positive stance of the Hungarian population is based 
on two major historical circumstances. First, although most of Hungary including Budapest was 
conquered by the Ottomans, these territories were retaken in 1699/1717, which means that this 
era rather appears in history books than current political debates. Even if the Ottoman conquest 
is viewed as a negative development by the majority of the Hungarian population, the 
government usually did not use it to boost anti-Turkey sentiments. Additionally, Hungary and the 
Ottoman Empire rather cooperated during the last centuries: the Ottoman Empire hosted 
several waves of Hungarian refugees and they fought together in World War I. In consequence, 
the Hungarian nation-building process of the 19-20
th
 Century did not perceive Turks as a threat 
but rather as an ally against the neighbours. 
The positive view was further strengthened by Turanism (an ideology advocating cooperation 
between the Turkic and Hungarian peoples on the basis of their alleged unity), which has gained 
a new impetus in Hungary after 1990 (and especially after 2008) and has motivated certain 
groups to view Turkey and the Turkic people in a very positive way.  
                                                          
1
 The EU 28 Country Reports were completed before the Turkish Constitutional Referendum on 16 April 2017. 
Thus, the report does not take account of any potential changes in the national debate that might have 
occurred in the meantime. 
  
 








Secondly, Hungary does not have a great number of Turkish immigrants or a historical Turkish 
minority. Turkish Diaspora settled in Hungary after 1989 and their number is around 3,000-
5,000, which makes this group practically marginal within a country of 10 million inhabitants. 
They seem to be integrated in the eyes of the society and no tensions have emerged. Even 
during the refugee crisis that led to growing anti-migrant and anti-Muslim sentiments in 
HuŶgarǇ, the goǀerŶŵeŶt’s staŶdpoiŶt ǁas to aǀoid the deďate aďout Islaŵ in order to preserve 
good relations with (among others) Turkey. 
Although a positive sentiment can be detected towards Turkey, EU-Turkish relations and the 
enlargement process including the ongoing negotiations got very limited media coverage and do 
not feature prominently in the public debate in Hungary. Hungarian-Turkish relations are usually 
discussed on a bilateral – rather than European – level, which pushes the issue of accession into 
the background. The Hungarian EU Presidency in the first half of 2011 did Ŷot prioritize TurkeǇ’s 
membership negotiations, even though the Hungarian government expressed its support for the 
Turkish case. 
After the violent downturn of the Gezi protests in 2013, Turkey and its actions were increasingly 
discussed in the public sphere. Most of the time, these debates focused on value-based issues 
like the treatment of the protesters or on the state of Turkish democracy. It was mainly the left-
wing (opposition) political scene that criticized the developments concerning human rights and 
freedom of the media, pointing out that under these circumstances full EU membership was out 
of question. 
TurkeǇ’s role iŶ haŶdliŶg the ϮϬϭϱ ŵigratioŶ refugee Đrisis aŶd the following events in 2016 
;failed Đoup atteŵpt, AŶkara’s rapproĐheŵeŶt to Russia and its military campaign in Syria) have 
also shaped the narratives: the country which had gotten limited attention in public debate 
reappeared as an important, Muslim country. However, Hungarian pro-government media and 
the official government position are both rather interest based about EU-Turkey relations, 
claiming that accession negotiations should be maintained in order to keep Turkey as a partner 
of the European Union and less focused on identity issues. Stability and security concerns, as 
well as the Turkey’s geopolitiĐal positioŶ also deterŵiŶe the poliĐǇ areas ǁhere ĐooperatioŶ is 
needed, for example in the fields of migration/Syrian refugees living in Turkey, visa issues, or the 
fight against terrorism. 
1.3. Policy areas: focus on economy and energy 
After 2010, the Hungarian government made economy an increasingly important part of 
bilateral relations with Turkey. Turkey represents a large market and a great investment 
opportunity for Hungarian companies; for this reason, it has become one of the main 
destiŶatioŶs of the HuŶgariaŶ goǀerŶŵeŶt’s ͞Eastǁard opeŶiŶg͟. The idea of collaboration in 
the field of eŶergǇ traŶsport, espeĐiallǇ after Russia’s deĐisioŶ to lauŶĐh the Turkish “treaŵ 
project in 2014 raised more attention among political and business circles in Hungary. The next 
  
 








high-level bilateral meeting on economic cooperation will be held in spring 2017. The Hungarian 
goǀerŶŵeŶt is eager to proŵote HuŶgariaŶ eĐoŶoŵiĐ iŶterests iŶ TurkeǇ. Hoǁeǀer, TurkeǇ’s EU 
accession as a positive development in further economic cooperation rarely appears in the 
debate. 
2. Future of EU-Turkey Relations 
2.1. Dominant views on the future of EU-Turkey relations: doubts 
EǀeŶ though the offiĐial HuŶgariaŶ positioŶ is positiǀe toǁards TurkeǇ’s EU aĐĐessioŶ, the 
current public debate about its prospects is rather negative. While identity-based narratives 
aďout TurkeǇ’s EuropeaŶ ideŶtitǇ aŶd historǇ ǁere side-lined during the past few years (even if it 
appears from time to time in the right-wing, pro-government media), value-based and pragmatic 
discourse has gained strength. The value-based narratives about the state of democracy in 
Turkey, the Gezi events in 2013, the war on terror and the failed coup attempt in July 2016 have 
ǁeakeŶed AŶkara’s prospeĐts to aĐĐede to the EU aĐĐordiŶg to HuŶgariaŶ puďliĐ opiŶioŶ. The 
slow negotiation process that started twelve years ago and resulted in limited concrete 
outcomes and the increasing worries about Turkish domestic politics led to increasing scepticism 
in the Hungarian public.  
There is limited variation concerning the outcome of EU-Turkey accession between Hungarian 
political parties and this seems to be cemented for the upcoming years as well.  Despite the 
criticism, a limited cooperation seems to find support in all parties. Regarding the EU context, 
government parties in line with the official position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasize 
the need to continue the negotiations in order to avoid a possible crisis and downturn in 
relations with Turkey that would entail unfortunate consequences for both Hungary and the EU, 
especially because of the migration crisis and the security challenges. Nevertheless, even if 
dialogue is supported by the government, there is no strong political will in Hungary to become 
an engine of the accession process, which suggests that Hungary favours an engagement 
without quick accession. Left-wing/liberal opposition parties expressed more criticism towards 
Turkey and they also criticized the EU for not being strong enough in criticising human rights 
violations in Turkey and for not putting more pressure on the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) government. However, even pro-government Hungarian media criticized Turkey because 
of the same, democracy-related issues.  
The Hungarian far-right party, Jobbik, traditionally has a pro-Turkey stance which separates it 
froŵ its WesterŶ EuropeaŶ ĐouŶterparts. It ŵeaŶs that the partǇ’s leadership sees AŶkara as a 
poteŶtial stroŶg partŶer. Joďďik’s ĐhairŵaŶ eǀeŶ visited Turkey several times and made positive 
statements about Turkey and Islam and highlighted the good relations between Turks and 
HuŶgariaŶs ǁho are, aĐĐordiŶg to these deĐlaratioŶs, ͞ďrothers aŶd graŶdsoŶs of Attila, the 
famous Hun chieftain from the earlǇ Middle Ages͟. This stateŵeŶt is frequently used in 
  
 








Hungarian and Turkish nationalist circles. However, Eurosceptic Jobbik did not make any official 
stateŵeŶts either iŶ faǀour of or agaiŶst TurkeǇ’s EU aĐĐessioŶ. Turkish-Hungarian relations in 
the partǇ’s disĐourse usuallǇ do Ŷot appear iŶ the EU fraŵe.  
2.2. Possible alternatives: marginal 
In Hungary, the deďate aďout TurkeǇ’s EU prospeĐts did Ŷot go as far as suggestiŶg a partŶership 
different from full membership, such as a ͞privileged͟ or ͞strategic͟ partnership. The 
government does not abandon its support for TurkeǇ’s full EU membership. There was no deep, 
detailed public discussion on possible alternatives in the country. Probably due to the limited 
concrete achievements of more than a decade of accession negotiations, the idea of TurkeǇ’s 
membership including this question or the idea of any kind of partnership between Turkey and 
the EU got little attention and was not part of the public debate even in expert circles. The 
events of 2015 and 2016 transforŵed this piĐture aŶd turŶed the puďliĐ’s atteŶtioŶ toǁards 
Ankara. However, the issue of Turkey-EU accession talks has remained marginal in the public 
sphere. 
2.3. Refugee crisis as mind-set for the debate on EU-Turkey relations  
The HuŶgariaŶ Priŵe MiŶister’s stateŵeŶt aďout illiďeral deŵoĐraĐies – including Turkey – at 
TusŶádfürdő iŶ ϮϬϭϰ paǀed the ǁaǇ for the deďate aďout the state of deŵoĐraĐǇ iŶ TurkeǇ aŶd 
drew the attention to the growing authoritarian tendencies. The media and public opinion began 
to focus on media freedom, free speech and restrictions of the internet and social media such as 
Twitter and Facebook. These developments received criticism from the left and the right alike, 
both interpreting it as an authoritarian turn in Turkish domestic politics that hindered the 
ĐouŶtrǇ’s prospeĐts of EU aĐĐessioŶ.  
The migration/refugee crisis that started to dominate Hungarian domestic politics in the spring 
of 2015 brought Turkey into the limelight again. Especially after the EU-Turkey Summit of 29 
November 2015, Hungarian media started to focus on Turkey and its commitment to hold back 
the Syrian refugees. The following months brought about a new wave of debates about Turkey. 
The main narrative of these debates was whether or not Ankara was a trustworthy partner. A 
number of pro-government media outlets declared that Turkey was blackmailing the EU to get 
more money without fulfilling its promises. This debate slowly faded after April 2016 as irregular 
migration to Greece sharply declined; nevertheless, migration as a possible threat re-emerged 
immediately after the failed coup attempt: some raised the question if Turkey would be able to 
fulfil its commitments.   
The ŵigraŶt/refugee Đrisis iŶteŶsified the deďate aďout TurkeǇ’s future in the European Union 
especially because during this period Ankara expressed its willingness to open new chapters of 
the accession talks. However, this newly intensified discussion focused primarily on security 
issues, while accession issues were less important.  
  
 








After the failed coup attempt, the Hungarian government expressed several times its 
understanding for the steps that the Turkish government took, including mass detentions and 
the firing of tens of thousands of public employees. The narrative was based mainly on security 
and stability perspectives, claiming that the government had to re-establish stability in the 
country. AĐĐordiŶg to the HuŶgariaŶ goǀerŶŵeŶt, TurkeǇ’s staďilitǇ is iŶdispeŶsaďle for the 
security of the EU because of at least three major issues: the migration crisis, the war in Syria 
and the fight against terror. The official Hungarian foreign policy line maintained its support for 
stronger EU-TurkeǇ relatioŶs after the EuropeaŶ ParliaŵeŶt’s deĐisioŶ to teŵporarilǇ freeze the 
accession negotiations.   
The promised acceleration of the Turkish visa liberalization process has also raised a debate in 
Hungary. It was discussed in the Hungarian Parliament, for example, where the primary focus 
were the possible security consequences of the decision (i.e. that terrorists from Syria might 
come more easily to Europe). 
After the failed coup attempt in Ankara in July 2016 the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
reacted very quickly to the developments, expressing his support for the democratically elected 
Turkish government and condemning the ŵilitarǇ’s atteŵpt to seize poǁer. The HuŶgariaŶ 
government saw these strong declarations in favour of the Turkish government as an 
opportunity to deepen bilateral relations with Ankara, and this process culminated in the visit of 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Péter Szijjártó, to the Turkish capital in August 2016. He was the 
first EU minister to meet with his Turkish counterpart in Turkey after the failed coup attempt 
aŶd this further deŵoŶstrated HuŶgarǇ’s stroŶg support for the Turkish government.  
3. EU-Turkey Relations and the Neighbourhood/Global scene 
3.1. East first 
Since the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy, Hungary has been more interested in 
its Eastern than Southern dimension, due to geographical and historical reasons. Accordingly, 
Hungary has always been in favour of a separate treatment of the two dimensions. However, 
ǁhile fullǇ supportiǀe of the EU’s eŶlargeŵeŶt to the WesterŶ BalkaŶs, HuŶgarǇ had ďeeŶ 
somewhat sceptical towards a possible EU enlargement to the Eastern Neighbourhood even 
before the beginning of the Ukraine crisis in 2014. Hence, the breakout of this crisis and the 
subsequent war only added to the existing reluctance and scepticism of Hungarian elites and 
public about whether countries of Eastern Europe should ever be admitted to the European 
Union. 
Budapest was traditionally interested in the deepening of EU-Ukrainian relations (partly due to 
the presence of ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine), and has recently been relatively active in EU-
Moldavian relations within the Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative. At the same time, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and recently Belarus are perceived as important (potential) economic partners within 
  
 








the Hungarian foreign policy approach of ͟Eastward opening͟. However, relations with Armenia, 
the sixth EaP country, are still frozen (due to the Safarov affair). These country ͞priorities͟ are 
partly shared by Turkey, although rather on an ideological base.  
HuŶgariaŶs strategǇ of ͞Eastǁard opeŶiŶg͟ affeĐts also its position on the question of visa-
liberalization for Turkey. At a Visegrad 4-EaP meeting in May 2016, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Péter Szijjártó, strongly criticized its linkage to the refugee deal stating that while it was 
acceptable to grant visa liberalization to countries who fulfilled the requirements, ͞it would be 
an unacceptable situation from our perspective that Georgia and Ukraine would receive visa-free 
regime later than Turkey͟. 
The Mediterranean region has never been a priority in Hungarian foreign policy over the past 
decades, and was especially side-lined prior to HuŶgarǇ’s EU ŵeŵďership. Thus, the HuŶgariaŶ 
national attitude towards the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM) and the Mediterranean as a whole has evolved in the context of the 
ĐouŶtrǇ’s EU iŶtegratioŶ proĐess. The politiĐal Đrisis iŶ MediterraŶeaŶ ĐouŶtries after the Araď 
Spring, however, and especially the war in Syria, raised the interest of the Hungarian public 
towards the region.  
Although the eminent role of Turkey in dealing both with the political crisis and with the refugee 
crisis as a consequence are well known and widely accepted, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was 
criticizing the EU-Turkey statement on migration (refugee deal) in March 2016. As an argument 
iŶ faǀour of streŶgtheŶiŶg the EU’s eǆterŶal ďorder forĐes, he stated that the EU should Ŷot ďase 
its security on a third country, namely Turkey. The European Union should be able and ready to 
defend its borders instead in order to avoid additional billions of euros that would be added to 
the 3 billion euros paid for Turkey without reaching any satisfying solution.  
The Turkey-Russia reset of relations in the summer of 2016 also raised some concerns. This 
ŵoǀe ǁas largelǇ perĐeiǀed as a sigŶal of TurkeǇ’s shift froŵ its WesterŶ allies toǁards MosĐoǁ. 
ReĐep TaǇǇip ErdoğaŶ’s stateŵeŶt aďout joiŶiŶg the “haŶghai CooperatioŶ OrgaŶisatioŶ also got 
some attention in Hungary. These developments gave a fresh impetus to the discussions about 
AŶkara’s ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt to the EU aŶd its ǁilliŶgŶess to ĐoŶtiŶue the aĐĐessioŶ ŶegotiatioŶs, ďut 
also on its potential stance in dealing with political issues in the neighbourhood. 
3.2. Buffer state and energy hub 
Despite sceptical views regarding the refugee deal, Hungary considers cooperation on migration 
policy with Turkey as a key area of EU-Turkey relations. Hungarian official statements are in 
favour of refugee camps situated outside the European Union, and in this respect Turkey is the 
most important buffer state between the troubled neighbouring regions and the EU.  
Though less in the spotlight than in previous years, cooperation in the energy sector is another 
area, where Turkey as a hub and as a transit region is going to have an increasing role in the 
relations between the EU and its neighbourhood.  
  
 








3.3. Hybrid regimes of Europe, united? 
A core concept of the current governing forces in Hungary, several times emphasized by Prime 
Minister Orbán as well, is that we can witness nowadays a decline of the Western dominance 
and of the Western model alike. Therefore, attention must be turned towards the East, by 
accepting alternative political approaches and by cooperating with emerging economic powers. 
Turkey, as one of the closest to Europe of such powers, has an eminent role in this, both as a 
partner and as a transit route towards the East, manifested in the new Silk Road plans of China. 
As a consequence, EU-Turkey relations should be more based on the economic benefits of such 
cooperation for Europe, than on the inward-looking, accession-policy-focused and value-based 
approach followed by the EU. 
The similarities in the political trends of Russia, Turkey and Hungary are also often discussed in 
the Hungarian media. Despite differences in the historical, cultural, political and other 
frameworks and circumstances, the similarities of national-populistic rhetoric, the weakening of 
checks and balances, the growing role of the ͞leader͟ and clientelism, limitations to civil society, 
etc. are clearly visible. This also raises the question of possible political systems fitting the 
European Union – a core question of EU-Turkey relations as well. 
Links & Further Readings: 
 Adam, C. (2016): ͞Hungary passionately defends Turkey in EU, despite human rights 
violations͟, iŶ Hungarian Free Press, 13 December 2016, 
http://hungarianfreepress.com/2016/12/13/hungary-passionately-defends-turkey-in-eu-
despite-human-rights-violations/  
 Deák, A., Szigetvári, T., Rácz, A.  (2015): ͞CouŶtrǇ report: Hungary͟, iŶ EU-28 Watch, No. 
11 http://eu-28watch.org/issues/issue-no-11/hungary/  
 Inanç, Y.S. (2015): ͞Cultural institutions strengthen Turkish-Hungarian relations͟, iŶ Daily 
Sabah, 4 October 2015. http://www.dailysabah.com/europe/2015/10/05/cultural-
institutions-strengthen-turkish-hungarian-relations-1443983249  
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2015): High-level political consultations between 
Hungary and Turkey continue, 8 April 2015, http://www.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-
s-office/news/high-level-political-consultations-between-hungary-and-turkey-continue  
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2016): Stable Turkey is in best interest of Europe 
and Hungary, 23 August 2016, http://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-foreign-affairs-
and-trade/news/stable-turkey-is-in-best-interest-of-europe-and-hungary  












 The Budapest Sentinel (2016): Between democracy aŶd despotisŵ: HuŶgary’s traŶsitioŶal 
hybrid regime, 8 September 2016, http://budapestsentinel.com/articles/between-
democracy-and-despotism-hungarys-transitional-hybrid-regime/  
 Wirtschaftswoche (2016): Viktor Orbán: Europa liefert sich der Türkei aus, 20 April 2016, 
http://www.wiwo.de/politik/europa/ungarns-premier-viktor-orbn-europa-liefert-sich-
der-tuerkei-aus/13476716.html  
   
 
This project has received fuŶdiŶg froŵ the EuropeaŶ UŶioŶ’s HorizoŶ 2020 research and         
innovation programme under grant agreement No 692976. 
 
ABOUT FEUTURE 
FEUTURE sets out to explore fully different options for further EU-Turkey 
cooperation in the next decade, including analysis of the challenges and 
opportunities connected with further integration of Turkey with the EU.  
To do so, FEUTURE applies a comprehensive research approach with the 
following three main objectives: 
1. Mapping the dynamics of the EU-Turkey relationship in terms of their 
underlying historical narratives and thematic key drivers.  
2. Testing and substantiating the most likely scenario(s) for the future and 
assessing the implications (challenges and opportunities) these may have 
on the EU and Turkey, as well as the neighbourhood and the global scene. 
3. Drawing policy recommendations for the EU and Turkey on the basis of a 
strong evidence-based foundation in the future trajectory of EU-Turkey 
relations.   
FEUTURE is coordinated by Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Wessels, Director of the Centre for 
Turkey and European Union Studies at the University of Cologne and Dr. Nathalie 
Tocci, Director of Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome.  
The FEUTURE consortium consists of 15 renowned universities and think tanks 
from the EU, Turkey and the neighbourhood. 
Coordination Office at University of Cologne: 
Project Director:                             Dr. Funda Tekin 
Project and Financial Manager:   since November 2018 Darius Ribbe (previously  
                                                           Hanna-Lisa Hauge 









Disclaimer: This publication reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission 
cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained 
therein. 
